Researcher Theory
01.01.04 – 31.12.05
robrecht.vanderbeeken@pandora.be
Gilles Deleuze is one of the most important and popular philosophers of his generation. There is the evident relevance of his key ideas on simulacra, chaosmosis, becoming-woman, rhizome, schizo-analysis, interpretosis, etc. Especially his resistance to the ‘ideological’ imprisonment of thought, which blocks an affirmation of difference and becoming, is significant. According to Deleuze, philosophy and art is becoming. We have to create and repeat concepts and affects. In order to experience and maximize our life, we must go out scouting!
Before we simply adopt this ‘nomadic’ attitude, a crucial question remains: ‘Is his view theoretically sound?’ Typical for Deleuze is his radical and systematic thinking. He provides a consistent network of creative ideas without relying on notions like identity, representation, the human subject and even ‘being’. While emphasizing the primacy of difference, he gives us the impression that we are beyond modernism and post-modernism. But can Deleuze really give answers to the classical philosophical problems or is he just neglecting them? For instance, how can he combine his radical ontological claim while at the same time being sceptical about ‘truth’ and ‘representation’? Can he obtain a genuine epistemological perspective while simultaneously dispensing with the notion of a unified self that can travel over a thousand plateaus? These and other issues deserve our attention before we accept his daring philosophical position as a robust one. So, the question we have to face is: ‘Can we just go out scouting, like Deleuze?’
Wilrijk, BE.
PhD Philosophy (thesis: A pluralism of explanations of actions). University of Ghent, BE.
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